ABSTRACT The Internet is a powerful political instrument, which is increasingly employed by terrorists to forward their goals. The five most prominent contemporary terrorist uses of the Net are information provision, financing, networking, recruitment, and information gathering. This article describes and explains each of these uses and follows up with examples. The final section of the paper describes the responses of government, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and others to the terrorism-Internet nexus. There is a particular emphasis within the text on the UK experience, although examples from other jurisdictions are also employed. ________________________________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Thomas (see Conway forthcoming 2006) , the analysis below relies upon what have been determined to be the five core terrorist uses of the Net: information provision, financing, networking, recruitment, and information gathering. Each of these is explained and analyzed in more detail below.
CORE TERRORIST USES OF THE INTERNET Information Provision
This refers to efforts by terrorists to engage in publicity, propaganda and, ultimately, psychological warfare. The Internet, and the advent of the World Wide Web in particular, have significantly increased the opportunities for terrorists to secure publicity. This can take the form of historical information, profiles of leaders, manifestos, etc. But terrorists can also use the Internet as a tool of psychological warfare through spreading disinformation, delivering threats, and disseminating horrific images.
The most well-known example of the latter in the UK is the kidnap and murder of Liverpudlian Kenneth Bigley who was snatched from his house in Baghdad, along with two American colleagues, on 16 September, 2004. On 18 September, the Tawhid and Jihad group, allegedly headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, released a video of the three men kneeling in front of a Tawhid and Jihad banner; the kidnappers said they would kill the men within 48 hours if their demands for the release of Iraqi women prisoners held by coalition forces were not met. Armstrong was beheaded on September 20 when the deadline expired, Hensley some 24 hours later; videos of these killings were posted on the Internet shortly after the events took place.
A second video was released by Bigley's captors on 22 September. In this video Bigley is shown pleading for his life; he directly petitions the British Prime Minister saying, "I need you to help me now, Mr Blair, because you are the only person on God's earth who can help me." The video was posted on a number of Islamist websites and shown on Arab satellite television station al-Jazeera. A third video was released on 29
September showing Bigley, wearing an orange boiler suit, chained inside a small chicken-wire cage. In this video, Bigley is heard saying, "Tony Blair is lying. He doesn't care about me. I'm just one person." Bigley was beheaded on 7 October, 2004. The kidnappers filmed Bigley's murder and these images were subsequently posted on a number of Islamist sites and on at least one US 'shock' website. According to news reports, the video shows Bigley reading out a statement, before one of the kidnappers steps forward and cuts off his head with a knife.
Another Briton, Margaret Hassan, was kidnapped on 19 October, 2004 and is thought to have been murdered some weeks later. In a video released of her in captivity, Hassan pleads for the withdrawal of British troops from Iraq, stating "these might be my last hours…Please help me. The British people, tell Mr Blair to take the troops out of Iraq and not bring them here to Baghdad." She also says "I don't want to die like Bigley." In November 2004, al-Jazeera reported that it had received a tape allegedly showing Hassan's murder, but was unable to confirm its authenticity. The video shows a woman, referred to as Hassan, being shot by a masked gunman. Margaret Hassan's body was never recovered. The kidnaps, video-based appeals, and subsequent murders and attendant video footage of both Bigley and Hassan received widespread attention on the Internet and in the mass media, both in Britain and worldwide.
Until the advent of the Internet, terrorists' hopes of winning publicity for their causes and activities depended on attracting the attention of television, radio, or the print media. Such attention remains attractive but, as Weimann points out, "these traditional media have 'selection thresholds' (multistage processes of editorial selection) that terrorists often cannot reach" (2004a, 6). The same criteria do not, of course, apply to the terrorists' own websites. The Internet thus offers terrorist groups an unprecedented level of direct control over the content of their message(s). It considerably extends their ability to shape how different target audiences perceive them and to manipulate not only their own image, but also the image of their enemies. Although, for many groups, their target audience may be small, an Internet presence is nonetheless expected. Regardless of the number of hits a site receives, a well-designed and well-maintained Web site gives a group an aura of legitimacy and increasingly attracts attention from the mass media in and of itself.
Financing
This refers to efforts by terrorist groups to raise funds for their activities. Money is terrorism's lifeline; it is "the engine of the armed struggle" (Napoleoni 2004, 1) . The immediacy and interactive nature of Internet communication, combined with its highreach properties, opens up a huge potential for increased financial donations as has been demonstrated by a host of non-violent political organizations and civil society actors.
Terrorists seek financing both via their Web sites and by using the Internet infrastructure to engage in resource mobilization using illegal means.
Direct Solicitation Via Terrorist Web Sites
Numerous terrorist groups request funds directly from Web surfers who visit their sites.
Such requests may take the form of general statements underlining the organizations need for money, more often than not however requests are more direct urging supporters to donate immediately and supplying either bank account details or an Internet payment option. At one time, indeed, the Ulster Loyalist Information Service, which was affiliated with the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), and accepted funds via PayPal, invited those who were "uncomfortable with making monetary donations" to donate other items, including bulletproof vests.
Another way in which groups raise funds is through the establishment of online stores and the sale of items such as books, audio and video tapes, flags, t-shirts, etc. In a twist on this scenario, a website linked to the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, an organization regarded as the political wing of the Real IRA, carried a link to the Internetbased book retailer Amazon.com on its top page, which asked visitors to "support our prisoners by shopping through the following link;" commissions generated by any purchases generated through linking from the site--between three and five per cent of sales prices--would have been contributed from Amazon to the site owners. The link was removed in November 2000 shortly after it had gone live. A spokesperson for the retailer was reported to have said "no purchases were made via its web page so no money--not one penny--has been paid or will be paid by Amazon to the group" (Hyde 2000, 2).
Exploitation of E-Commerce Tools & Entities
The Internet facilitates terrorist financing in a number of other ways besides direct solicitation via terrorist Web sites. According to Jean-Francois Ricard, one of France's top anti-terrorism investigators, many Islamist terror plots are financed through credit card fraud (Thomas 2003, 117) . Imam Samudra, sentenced to death for his part in the Bali bombing of 2002, has published a prison memoir of some 280 pages, which includes a chapter that acts as a primer on 'carding' (Sipress 2004, A19) . According to Dutch experts, there is strong evidence from international law enforcement agencies such as the FBI that at least some terrorist groups are financing their activities via advanced fee fraud, such as Nigerian-style scam e-mails. To date, however, solid evidence for such claims has not entered the public realm (Libbenga 2004 (Hinnen 2004, 18 ; see also Emerson 2002, 11-12 & 16) .
Exploitation of Charities and Fronts
Terrorist organizations have a history of exploiting not just businesses, but also charities as undercover fundraising vehicles. This is particularly popular with Islamist terrorist groups, probably because of the injunction that observant Muslims make regular There is one trusted agency that has set up operations in the region and we will be posting their contact and bank details, etc. on the Internet very soon insha-Allah. This is the only aid agency that the Qoqaz web-sites trust and recommend the people to give their donations to.
Shortly after this posting, the Qoqaz site created active donations links to two charities; one was BIF. Between January and April of 2000, BIF wire-transferred nearly $700,000
to Chechen separatist-linked bank accounts in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Latvia. Terrorists have also infiltrated branches of existing charities to raise funds clandestinely. Many such organizations provide the humanitarian services advertised: feeding, clothing, and educating the poor and illiterate, and providing medical care for the sick. As Todd Hinnen has pointed out, "it is important not to presume that charitable organizations have terrorist affiliations simply because they serve regions or religious or ideological communities with which terrorism may be associated" (2004, 17; 
Transforming Organizational Structures
Rand's John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini have been pointing to the emergence of new forms of terrorist organization attuned to the information age for some time. They contend, "terrorists will continue to move from hierarchical toward information-age network designs. More effort will go into building arrays of transnationally internetted groups than into building stand alone groups" (Arquilla et al 1999, 41) . This type of organizational structure is qualitatively different from traditional hierarchical designs. Terrorists are ever more likely to be organized to act in a more fully networked, decentralized, 'all-channel' manner. Ideally, there is no single, central leadership, command, or headquarters. Within the network as a whole there is little or no hierarchy and there may be multiple leaders depending upon the size of the group. In other words, there is no specific heart or head that can be targeted. To realize its potential, such a network must utilize the latest information and communications technologies. The
Internet is becoming an integral component of such organizations, according to the Rand analysts (Arquilla et al 1999, 48-53; Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001a ).
Planning and Coordination
"Many terrorist groups share a common goal with mainstream organizations and institutions: the search for greater efficiency through the Internet" (Margulies 2004, 2) .
Several reasons have been put forward to explain why modern IT systems, especially the Internet, are so useful for terrorists in establishing and maintaining networks. New technologies clearly enable quicker, cheaper, and more secure information flows. In addition, the integration of computing with communications has substantially increased the variety and complexity of the information that can be shared. (Weimann 2004a, 9) .
This led Michele Zanini to hypothesize that "the greater the degree of organizational networking in a terrorist group, the higher the likelihood that IT is used to support the network's decision making" (1999, 251). 
Mitigation of Risk
As terrorist groups come under increasing pressure from law enforcement, they have been forced to evolve and become more decentralized. This is a structure to which the Internet is perfectly suited. The Net offers a way for like-minded people located in different communities to interact easily, which is particularly important when operatives may be isolated and having to 'lie low.' Denied a physical place to meet and organize, many terrorist groups are alleged to have created virtual communities through chat rooms and
Web sites in order to continue spreading their propaganda, teaching, and training.
Clearly, "information technology gives terrorist organizations global power and reach without necessarily compromising their invisibility" (Tibbetts 2002, 5) . It "puts distance between those planning the attack and their targets… [and] provides terrorists a place to plan without the risks normally associated with cell or satellite phones" (Thomas 2003, 119) .
Recruitment
This refers to groups' efforts to recruit and mobilize sympathizers to more actively support terrorist causes or activities. The Web offers a number of ways for achieving this:
it makes information gathering easier for potential recruits by offering more information, more quickly, and in multimedia format; the global reach of the Web allows groups to publicize events to more people; and by increasing the possibilities for interactive communication, new opportunities for assisting groups are offered, along with more chances for contacting the group directly. Finally, through the use of discussion forums, it is also possible for members of the public--whether supporters or detractors of a group--to engage in debate with one another. This may assist the terrorist group in adjusting their position and tactics and, potentially, increasing their levels of support and general appeal (Gibson & Ward 2000, 305-306; Soo Hoo, Goodman & Greenberg 1997, 140; Weimann 2004a, 8) . Online recruitment by terrorist organizations is said to be widespread.
Weimann suggests that terrorist recruiters may use interactive Internet technology to roam online chat rooms looking for receptive members of the public, particularly young people. Electronic bulletin boards could also serve as vehicles for reaching out to potential recruits (2004a, 8) .
Information Gathering
This refers to the capacity of Internet users to access huge volumes of information, which was previously extremely difficult to retrieve as a result of its being stored in widely differing formats and locations. Today, there are literally hundreds of Internet tools that aid in information gathering; these include a range of search engines, millions of subjectspecific email distribution lists, and an almost limitless selection of esoteric chat and discussion groups. One of the major uses of the Internet by terrorist organizations is thought to be information gathering. Unlike the other uses mentioned above terrorists' information gathering activities rely not on the operation of their own Web sites, but on the information contributed by others to "the vast digital library" that is the Internet (Weimann 2004a, 6 ). There are two major issues to be addressed here. The first may be termed 'data mining' and refers to terrorists using the Internet to collect and assemble information about specific targeting opportunities. The second issue is 'information sharing,' which refers to more general online information collection by terrorists.
Data Mining
In In addition to information provided by and about the armed forces, the free availability of information on the Internet about the location and operation of nuclear reactors and related facilities was of particular concern to public officials post 9/11. Roy Zimmerman, director of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, said the 9/11 attacks highlighted the need to safeguard sensitive information. In the days immediately after the attacks, the NRC took their Web site entirely off line. When it was restored weeks later, it had been purged of more than 1,000 sensitive documents. Initially, the agency decided to withhold documents if "the release would provide clear and significant benefit to a terrorist in planning an attack." Later, the NRC tightened the restriction, opting to exclude information "that could be useful or could reasonably be useful to a terrorist." According to Zimmerman, "it is currently unlikely that the information on our Web site would provide significant advantage to assist a terrorist" (Ahlers 2004 ).
The measures taken by the NRC were not exceptional. According to a report produced by OMB Watch, 6 since 9/11 thousands of documents and tremendous amounts of data have been removed from US government sites. The difficulty, however, is that Terrorists can also use the Internet to learn about antiterrorism measures. Gabriel
Weimann suggests that a simple strategy like conducting word searches of online newspapers and journals could allow a terrorist to study the means designed to counter attacks, or the vulnerabilities of these measures (2004b, 15) .
Sharing Information
Policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and others are also concerned about the 
FIGHTING BACK
Use of the Internet is a double-edged sword for terrorists. They are not the only groups utilizing the Net to forward their goals, which can act as a valuable instrumental power source for anti-terrorist forces also. The more terrorist groups use the Internet to move information, money, and recruits around the globe, the more data that is available with which to trail them. Since 9/11 a number of groups have undertaken initiatives to disrupt terrorist use of the Internet, although a small number of such efforts were also undertaken previous to the attacks. Law enforcement agencies have been the chief instigators of such initiatives, but they have been joined in their endeavors by other government agencies as well as concerned individuals and groups of hacktivists.
The Role of Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies

Intelligence Gathering
The bulk of this chapter has been concerned with showing how the Internet can act as a significant source of instrumental power for terrorist groups. Use of the Internet can nonetheless also result in significant undesirable effects for the same groups. 
Other Innovations
Shortly after 9/11, MI5 took the unprecedented step of posting an appeal for information about potential terrorists on dissident Arab websites. The message, in Arabic, was placed on sites that the authorities knew were accessed by extremists, including 'Islah.org,' a Saudi Arabian opposition site, and 'Qoqaz.com,' a Chechen site which advocated jihad.
The message read:
The atrocities that took place in the USA on 11 September led to the deaths of about five thousand people, including a large number of Muslims and people of other faiths. MI5 (the British Security Service) is responsible for countering terrorism to protect all UK citizens of whatever faith or ethnic group. If you think you can help us to prevent future outrages call us in confidence on 020-7930 9000.
MI5 were hopeful of eliciting information from persons on the margins of extremist groups or communities who were sufficiently shocked by the events of 9/11 to want to contact the agency. The agency had intended to post the message on a further fifteen sites known to be accessed by radicals, but many of these were shut down by the FBI in the aftermath of the attacks (Gruner & Naik 2001; Norton-Taylor 2001 Ahmad's trial will serve as yet another test of the new US antiterrorism law that makes it a crime to provide material support in the form of expert advice or assistance to terrorists, including IT support. Clearly, Ahmad's case will be one to watch in terms of its impact on terrorism-related Internet-based speech.
In the meantime, researchers are still unclear whether the ability to communicate online worldwide has contributed to the increase in terrorist violence. It is agreed, however, that online activities substantially improve the ability of such terrorist groups to raise funds, lure new faithful, and reach a mass audience. The most popular terrorist sites draw tens of thousands of visitors each month. Obviously, the Internet is not the only tool that a terrorist group needs to 'succeed.' However, the Net can add new dimensions to existing assets that groups can utilize to achieve their goals as well as providing new and innovative avenues for expression, fundraising, recruitment, etc. At the same time, there are also tradeoffs to be made. High levels of visibility increase levels of vulnerability, both to scrutiny and security breaches. Nonetheless, the proliferation of official terrorist sites appears to indicate that the payoffs, in terms of publicity and propaganda value, are understood by many groups to be worth the risks.
